Abstract-Cloud computing is an emerging computing paradigm where computing resources are provided as services over Internet while residing in a large data center. Even though it enables us to dynamically provide servers with the ability to address a wide range of needs, this paradigm brings forth many new challenges for the data security and access control as users outsource their sensitive data to clouds, which are beyond the same trusted domain as data owners. A fundamental problem is the existence of insecure information flows due to the fact that a service provider can access multiple virtual machines in clouds.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although cloud computing is based on a collection of many existing and few new concepts in several research areas like service-oriented-architecture (SOA) [11] , distributed and grid computing [12] , [13] as well as virtualization [7] , [23] , it has become a promising computing paradigm drawing extensive attention from both academia and industry. This paradigm shifts the location of computing infrastructure to the network as service associated with the management of hardware and software resources. It has shown tremendous potential to enhance collaboration, scale, agility and availability.
Along with this new paradigm, various cloud service deliv ery models are developed, which can be divided into three layers [22] depending on the type of resources provided by the cloud. The bottom-most layer provides fundamental computing resources such as processing, storage, networks and is, henceforth, denoted as IaaS. A consumer is able to deploy and run arbitrary sofiwares, which include operating systems and applications. Amazon's EC2 and S3 [1] are prominent examples for IaaS in cloud computing. On the top of IaaS, more platform-oriented services allow the usage of hosting environments tailored to a specific need. Google App Engine [2] is an example for a Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) which enables to deploy and dynamically scale Python and Java based Web applications. The top-most layer provides its users with ready to use applications running on a cloud infras tructure, also known as Software-as-a-Service (SaaS). Users can access those applications through a thin client interface such as a Web browser. Salesforce Customer Relationships Management [4] is an example of SaaS.
All of those services provide users with scalable resources in the pay-as-you-go fashion at relatively low costs. For example, Amazon's EC2 sells 1.0-GHz x86 ISA 'slices' for $0.10 per hour, and a new 'slice', or instance, can be added in 2 to 5 minutes. Amazon's S3 charges $0.12 to $0.15 per gigabyte month, with additional bandwidth charges of $0.10 to $0.15 per gigabyte to move data into and out of Amazon Web Services over the Internet [5] . Comparing with building and managing their own infrastructures, users are able to save their investments significantly by migrating businesses to a cloud. With the increasing development of cost-effective cloud computing technologies, it is not hard to imagine that more and more businesses will be adopting cloud computing in the near future.
As promising as it is, cloud computing is also facing many security challenges [21] includ ing authentication and identity management, access control, policy integration and so on. If not properly resolved, those challenges may hinder cloud computing's fast growth. Our work focuses on access control issues in cloud computing environments that would raise great concerns from customers, which can be of individuals, organizations, or enterprises when they outsource sensitive data to clouds. These concerns are traceable to the fact that cloud infrastructures are usually operated by commercial service providers that are outside of the trusted domain of the users, even in another country with a different regulatory environment. Insecure information flows [17] exist in clouds at a very high rate since a service provider can access mUltiple cloud virtual machines where various customers' data are stored. This can raise conflict-of-interest issues when the service provider discloses sensitive information of a customer to other competing customers for commercial profits, which can cause tremendous loss to a customer. This problem is more obvious when consulting services are migrated into clouds. It is natural that consultants have to deal with confidential information stored in clouds for their customers.
Consider a scenario shown in Figure 1 where a service provider provides business consulting services [3] using cloud infrastructure. His customers consist of banks including Bank of America (BoA), Chase and HSBC, and airline companies including United Airlines (VA) and Delta Air Lines (Delta). All of his customers need to outsource their consulting re lated data to cloud virtual machines running on the cloud In this paper, we propose an approach to enforce the information flow policies at IaaS layer in a cloud computing environment. Especially, we adopt Chinese Wall policies [9] to address the problems of insecure information flow. We imple ment a proof-of-concept prototype system based on Eucalyptus open source packages [19] , [20] to show the feasibility of our approach. This system facilitates the cloud management modules to resolve the conflict-of-interest issues for service providers in clouds.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We give an overview of the information flow policies focusing on Chinese Wall security policy in Section II. In Section III, we present an approach to enforce Chinese Wall security policy in cloud computing at IaaS layer, which can be used to eliminate insecure information flow problem in clouds.
Section IV describes the system design of our prototype cloud management system. Section V presents the implementation details followed by the related work in Section VI. Finally, in Section VII we conclude the paper with a summary of our results and a discussion of issues that remain to be addressed.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE CHINESE WALL SECURITY POLICY
Security policy research was derived from the formal def inition of military security policy, succeeded by the Bell LaPadula [8] , [16] . In 1987, Clark and Wilson drew much attention to the importance of commercial security policy mod els in their seminal paper [10] . They claimed that the needs of the commercial community are just as important as the needs of the military community. Furthermore they emphasized that the problems of the commercial community are diverse and therefore require their own security policy models. All of the above-mentioned policy models were designed to operate in a well-defined environment, ranging from a strict military environment to a commercial environment.
Brewer and Nash introduced the Chinese Wall Security
Policy [9] that makes use of subjects and objects to prevent information flows which cause conflict-of-interests for an individual consultant. All company information is stored in a hierarchical file system shown in Figure 2 which consists of three levels:
1) The lowest level consists of individual objects of infor mation, each being associated with a single company.
2) The intermediate level consists of company datasets which group all objects concerning the same company together.
3) The highest level consists of conflict of interest classes which group all company datasets whose companies are in the competition together.
Each individual object is associated with the name of the company dataset to which it belongs. Similarly, each company dataset is associated with the name of the conflict-of-interest class to which it belongs. The subject is the user in the system. Access to data is constrained by what data the subject has already accessed. All subjects are allowed to access at most one dataset which belongs to a same conflict-of-interest class.
The environment of stock exchange or investment house is a natural environment for this model. Consider the database of an investment house, which consists of company information about investment that investors are interested in requesting.
Analysts use these information to guide the companies' m vestments, as well as those of individuals. Challenge 3: Expressiveness and Effectiveness of Policy Spec ification. To control the access to cloud virtual machines for preventing information leaks, we need to define the policy specification. T he specified policies will help us determine whether access requests to cloud virtual machines should be granted or denied. Considering that access decision workload based on the policy in cloud computing environment is inten sive, we also need to design efficient algorithms to enforce policies.
In the subsequent sections, we first define subjects, objects and access operations in our Chinese Wall security model for a cloud computing environment. Based on these definitions, we then define the specification of Chinese Wall security policy in clouds. Figure 2 shows the composition of objects in our scenario mentioned in Section I which consists of three levels as follows:
A. Chinese Wall Security Model in Clouds
1) The lowest level denotes individual objects and each object is a cloud instance associated with a security group.
2) The intermediate level denotes security groups including
BoA Group, Chase Group, HSBC Group, UA Group, Delta Group and Sanitized Group and each security group contains several cloud instances.
3) The highest level denotes conflict-of-interest classes including Bank COl class, Airlines Company COl class and Sanitized COl class.
Note that the sanitized COl class contains a sanitized group which does not have conflict-of-interest issues with any other security group. The cloud instances in the sanitized group usually provide some utility services which do not store or process any customer related data. We denote the sanitized object as objo. Based on the three levels of objects as shown in Figure 2 , we further derive two properties associated with objects:
1) Any two objects which belong to the same security group belong to the same conflict of interest class.
2) Any two objects which belong to different conflict of interest classes belong to different security groups.
We formally define the above two properties as follows:
• OG � 0 x G is a many-to-one cloud instance object-to security group assignment relation. (obj. g) E OG means an object obj belongs to a security group g;
• GC C G x C is a many-to-one security group-to-COl class -assignment relation. (g. c) E GC means the security group g belongs to the COl class c;
• 0 ----+ G is a function that maps a cloud instance object to a security group. SG(Obji) = {g E G I (Obji' g) E OG}; and
• 0 ----+ C is a function that maps a cloud instance object to a COl class. COI(obji) = {c E C I (Obji. gi) E OG 1\ (9i, c) E GC}. Therefore, object properties are defined as:
To better understand how the composition of objects distributes on the cloud infrastructure, we also depict our scenario in Figure 3 . There are 16 VMs (cloud instances) running on 4 nodes, each of which is actually a physical machine.
Each security group consists of several instances across nodes. 
[Subjects] A subject of the Chinese Wall security policy in the cloud computing environment is a user who accesses to the data or services hosted in the cloud instance. Let S denote the set of subjects. S = {81 .... 8n}.
Definition 7: [Access Operations] An access operation includes reading and writing data and using services hosted in the cloud instance by a subject. Let
• ACC � S x 0 be a many-to-many subject-to-object access relation. A subject-to-object access relation can be represented by (sub. obj) E ACC, which means the subject sub has accessed the object obj,
• ACC ----+ Boolean be a function that maps a subject-to object access relation to a boolean value, where -Access(sub, obj) = {true I (sub. obj) E ACC}, -Access(sub, obj) = {false I (sub, obj) rt-ACC}.
B. Chinese Wall Security Policy Specification
We also capture policies based on the elements defined above. Let OA is a function mapping each subject to a set of objects, OA(subi) = {obj E 0 IAccess(subi, obj) = true}. Then a subject sub E S can access an object obj E 0 if and only if any of the following requirements holds:
1) There is an object ob)' E 0 such that Access(sub, obj') = true and SG(obj') = SG(obj); 2) For all objects ob)', ob)' E OA(sub) =} COI(obj') -=I COI(obj);
where, initially OA(sub) = 0, and the initial access request is assumed to be granted.
The above policy implies that a subject is allowed to access any object in the same security group he has already accessed.
A subject is also allowed to access any object in a different security group which is in a different COl class compared with the security groups he has accessed. A subject is freely access any object in the sanitized security group. Considering Alice as a consultant for all the customers mentioned in our scenario, 
VI. RELATED WORK
There exist several research work on adopting the Chinese Wall security policy for distributed environments. Minsky [18] proposed the scalable enforcement of a Chinese Wall policy under the inherently decentralized Law-Governed Interaction mechanism. However, the policy enforcement in their ap proach is decentralized, which is not appropriate for control ling the access to infrastructure resources due to the high implementation and management cost.
Atluri, Chun, and Mazzoleni [6] proposed a Chinese Wall security policy for the decentralized workflow environment, in which they modified the original Chinese Wall policy and enforced read and write rules using restrictive partitions.
However, their approach is not scalable enough to support the elastic nature of cloud computing.
Katsuno, Watanabe, Furuichi and Kudo [14] proposed a Chinese Wall Process Confinement offering application-level distributed coalitions with a mandatory access control mech anism for all operating system processes. They implemented a prototype system called ALDC which provides secure op erations for office documents on Microsoft Windows even when there are conflicts of interest between the documents.
However, their approach is application-dependent and would not be applicable to infrastructure level where we focus in this paper.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we first identified the information flow prob lem which could raise conflict-of-interest issues in cloud com puting environments. Also, we have articulated challenges in specifying and enforcing information control policies in cloud computing. To address the identified problem and challenges, we proposed an approach to enforce the Chinese Wall security policy at the laaS layer of a cloud. We also implemented a prototype system based on Eucalyptus open-source software to prove the feasibility of our approach.
For the future work, rigorous experiments need to be con ducted to evaluate the performance of our system. We would improve our approach to support more fine-grained control with generic policy management modules. For instance, we would investigate how laaS management can be complied with both PaaS and SaaS. In addition, a user may wish to delegate his cloud instance access privileges to others. A practical delegation mechanism is another essential component for cloud computing.
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